A good argument can be made that sophisticated investors should have been more wary about FiT returns and built into models the potential of financially punishing retroactive changes to the rules.  It is likely that most investor groups did assume the possibility of these outcomes but unfortunately ranked changes to FiT programs so low (on a percentage basis) that the potential of a negative financial outcome did not weigh enough to effect the go/no go decision making model. This would indicate that the high potential of confirmation bias (the subconscious need to seek supporting evidence) was ignored. 

The photovoltaic industry has starkly divided itself into the multi-megawatt (utility scale) applications with installations that are removed from the load and rates are set by bid,
distributed generation residential and commercial systems (roof and ground) visible to the populations that are served, and off grid installations, in specific, remote habitation and remote industrial. Multi-megawatt (utility scale) installations effectively commoditize the electricity sold and it is very hard to climb back up that slippery slope, it is difficult to feel a
personal attachment to a commodity. DG (distributed generation) residential and
commercial installations, near the load and either owned or leased involve the
community in its energy present and future and are not commodities.  Off grid installation also involve the served communities and are not commodities.   

The FiT is slowly though dramatically (for participants) being replaced by bidding processes to set the rates at which electricity is sold.  Unfortunately, bidding processes are typically rife with parties that underbid, and the very process of underbidding (even the awareness of the possibility of it) tends to influence all parties in the exercise. The term for the effect of observers on a process is the observer effect, that is, participants in a process who are aware of being watched tend to adjust their behavior accordingly.  As a result of this psychological phenomenon, bids on solar projects are quite low, particularly in markets such as India.  As these low bids are seen as reflective of the true cost of installation (including labor), the process tends to hold margins for all participants hostage to expectations of ever lower bids.  The price paid for tight margins may well be the quality control function at all points along the value chain and ironically, this may lead to less productive (in terms of kilowatts out) installations. 

As deployment of PV has entered the gigawatt range globally, quality, both in terms of PV modules and installations, is increasingly coming under scrutiny.  Quality installations and PV components should have always been of primary concern to the solar industry and its many stakeholders.  Decreasing incentives and PPA/tariff rates set by bid have put pressure on quality control for both components and installations. 

Though recycling is important, it is equally important to have an industry focus on increasing
quality requirements.  Simply put, a minimum standard, which most standards are, is not enough.  The PV industry is simply too small in comparison with conventional energy and wind to accept less than the highest quality. Acceptance of lower quality will come at a high cost in terms of solar’s future as a primary electricity choice in the future energy mix.

Access to capital is a growing entry barrier inthe photovoltaic industry, with the caveat that access to capital alone is insufficient to compete.  As the cost of establishing and maintaining a com­petitive PV business increases, the ability to convince investors or parents to commit capital will be critical.  Capital commitment will not only determine business direction; it will dictate business survival.

Industry cycles are not creating a positive atmosphere for investors.  Solar-grade silicon supply, quality, and pricing are limiting scale-up and driving down yield.  Manufacturers are now looking at thin films as a potential solution, but high-yield thin-film production in volume has yet to be established to meet the growing market demand.

 Over the next ten years, investment will be needed in three key areas for PV cost reduction to continue:  increased capacity and automation, solar-grade silicon supply, and development and promotion of sustainable markets.  Without an investment in each area, market growth and cost reduction will slow down.  Sustainable market development will involve market education, increasing low-interest financing in the industrialized world and creating financial mechanisms and infrastructure in the developing world.  As capital requirements increase, the importance of the strategic business decisions are magnified.  Spe­cific business development plans will need to be formed with near- to mid-term profitability as the common denominator.

With the rapid deployment of gigawatt levels of capacity, much of it into multi-megawatt installations, quality has become a concern for module product as well as system installations.  As an offshoot of quality concerns, production output (kilowatt hours) has also come into focus as PPA (power purchase agreement) or tender bidding often results in low remuneration per kilowatt hour.  For systems from which electricity is sold volume (more kilowatt hours) is crucial to profitability.  Because of this system and module due diligence has become important and insurance products are becoming more important as are operations and maintenance contracts.  As industries mature and deployment increases aftermarket products (such as insurance and warranties) become important revenue generators.   In the next several years there will likely be an overabundance of such products as well as shrinkage as the market becomes over served. It is crucial for new entrants (at all points in the value chain) understand that the photovoltaic industry continues to evolve and remains quite young in its history.  The profitable FiT model was a short lived phenomenon unlikely to be repeated.  As the industry grapples with developing pricing models that support R&D and quality control it must also cope with a rapid change from FiT to bidding processes.  The industry is currently not mature enough to make assumptions about which business model will provide the wining balance of profitable margins and value to customers.  Among the many misconceptions that need to be reversed is the successful selling of the photovoltaic industry product as a commodity, instead of a high value means of electricity production.

Current Issue of the Solar Flare Mini Report on sale now

Contents Include: A perspective on quality, 2013 Demand/Supply/Price update, analysis of the market potential for mobile solar, and more.

For purchase contact: paulamspv@yahoo.com

Sample Text:

Mid-2013 finds some manufacturers and demand side participants struggling. In Europe, strong demand for modules in advance of the potential increase in tariffs on module product from China has led to an uptick in prices as well as a temporary shortage of modules. In Japan, strong domestic demand has led to unavailability of Japanese technology for buyers outside of Japan.  Continued excitement about the market in Chile may prove disappointing, as of June ~70-MWp had been installed.  In the US, a significant change in climate policy has already run up against more than one promised legal challenge and will likely not offer immediate gratification. In sum, as the 2013 meets the midway mark there is enough hope and anxiety to go around the global industry more than once.

It’s the time of year when quarterly results are anticipated (or dreaded) and bad news is magically turned upside down under the heading: losses were lower than expected.  Of course … losses are not good news and in any case, Q1 results are not great indicators of what the scope of the year will bring. 

Table 1 offers select manufacturer Q1 data.  The group in Table 1 shipped 44% of Q1 total shipments of 7.3-GWp.  The revenues for manufacturers in Table 1 were 57% of Q1 cell/module revenues of $5.9-billion.  Observing Table 1, gross margins were positive for these manufacturers (with the exception of LDK), while operating margins were negative, (with the exception of First Solar, and Canadian Solar).  The manufacturers in Table 1 lost a total of $485.6-million, with only First Solar reporting a net gain for Q1. 

In Q1 2013, crystalline manufacturers benefited from lower polycrystalline costs, nonetheless, given the financial bloodletting of 2012, the return of positive gross margins for many manufacturers is welcome and offers hope for a the beginnings of a recovery.

Table 1: Select PV Manufacturer PV Revenues

Manufacturer

Shipments

Revenues

Gross Margin

Operating Margin

Net Loss

First Solar (1)

296.0

$755.2

22.40%

8.10%

$59.1

SunPower (2)

166.4

$635.4

9.30%

-3.71%

$62.0

Renesola

327.0

$284.0

2.00%

-11.76%

$39.0

JA Solar

437.5

$270.0

6.00%

-5.07%

$33.3

Canadian Solar

340.0

$263.6

9.70%

6.83%

$3.9

Trina

393.0

$260.2

1.70%

-15.41%

$63.7

Yingli

598.0

$431.4

4.10%

-2.80%

$98.5

Hanwha

289.1

$179.2

2.60%

-11.50%

$36.4

LDK Sunways (3)

31.4

$104.3

-57.00%

-89.40%

$187.1

Jinko (4)

313.2

$187.3

12.65%

-1.44%

$20.8

Total

3191.6

$3,370.6

1.35%

-12.62%

$485.6

1) First Solar revenues include its   system business

2) SunPower revenues include its   system business

3) LDK revenues include shipments of   240-MWp of wafers

4) Jinko Solar revenues include   shipments of 25.4-MWp of wafers

 

A healthy recovery should take the lessons of the recent ten years into account. 

Lesson #1: What the government gives (incentives) the government may well take away, reduce or change drastically. An object lesson in this regard is Spain, which has an abundance of bankrupt systems. Another object lesson is the Ontario, Canada FiT for large systems, which has been changed to a bidding system. Diversify. 

Lesson #2: Building significant manufacturing capacity on the basis of often fickle incentive programs (even FiTs) may serve the manufacturer well in the short term, but will come back as expense down the road when the market is less profitable or shut down altogether. Building capacity based on a conservative forecast may mean you cannot serve all the near term business, but it will leave you with less idle capacity to support when times are bad.

Lesson #3: Fully committing to catch phrases (such as grid parity) while announcing that extremely low module prices are progress may find manufacturers unable to raise prices and suffering low to no to negative margins.  Commitment to unachievable and highly profile goals may actually turn out to be a cost – be pragmatic.

Lesson #4: Business models are innovation engines for the solar industry.  They should appropriately reflect true solar costs. Solar is highly visible and ripe for business plan innovation. A model truly reflective of solar costs that takes into account the customer’s needs will win hearts, minds and wallets.

Lesson #5: Vertical integration is not the panacea for current industry problems that is, it is appropriate for some companies, but not for all companies.  Vertical integration comes and goes in all industries, look to your long term goals before you take the leap.

Many manufacturers are adding capacity circumspectly in 2013 some however, are building enthusiastically laying their hopes primarily on the market in Japan. It is worth noting that some utilities in Japan are stating that their goals concerning PV installations are already oversubscribed.  This lesson is worth remembering as strategies are planned for markets in Latin America and India as well as markets in other regions. 

Amid a barrage of changing (often retroactively) FiTs tariffs and programs, little to no control over raw material costs, severe downward price pressure (for all participants on the solar value chain), shifting markets, a lack of observer understanding about solar technologies as well as internal buy-in to poorly explained concepts such as grid parity, LCOE and the championship of interested outsiders who just want to see as much solar installed as possible whether or not anyone makes any money — optimism is the life raft that keeps the solar industry from sinking.

It is easy to play on optimism, on the hopes of an industry that is beset on all sides by doubters, true believers as well as a host of competing energy technologies.  These days there is an overcapacity of information about how and when the industry will return to profitability – which markets will prove significant in size,  and which technology will arrive at a manufacturing cost low enough to support low prices. 

Optimism is necessary for solar industry participants to continue in the face of, basically, all-of-the above – but only if it does not blind them to the practical realities of day-to-day business in the energy world.  Several years ago an irrational belief in the inevitability of the FiT, which initially were profit machines that spawned the utility scale market.    It was assumed by most people that these instruments would never end, and would migrate from market to market opening the entire world up to the inevitability of solar. This has indeed proven true – the original FiT traveled from market to market shutting them down one by one while slowly evolving into the margin-destroying tender bidding model. 

Solar as an energy choice is here to stay – it is part of the climate change answer (and this is a problem optimism will not solve). The industry is selling electricity – and it must compete with available substitutes, but it is also selling independence and environmental responsibility.  Responsibility may be a tough sell, but independence is sexy. Maybe it is time to get back to the educating the public about the true value of high quality solar and then making certain that we live up to our promises.

It will not be easy and participants will continue to fall prey to get rich (or this is how you get rich) schemes, but in the end, practical optimism will win out and the world will be better for it. The coming recovery is not a dream … it is a practical reality that will come to pass in part because of the optimism of solar industry participants.

Tariff’s on wafers, cells and modules imported from China are in vogue these days. In June, the European Commission imposed tariffs in a graduate fashion with an 11.8% tariff beginning on June 6 and a 47.1% tariff beginning on August 6.  The reason for the two-step process is to encourage the government of China to negotiate. Commentary:  With the loss of several industry pioneers as well as startup PV technology companies of varying degrees of potential (from zero potential through mildly interesting to possibly groundbreaking) the damage of too-low prices for PV c-Si technology is already done. It might have been possible to mitigate the cost of aggressive pricing several years ago. Unfortunately, when the current period of underpricing began it was termed (by everyone) as progress towards grid parity.  Business entities and the individuals that make up these concerns on all spectrums of the PV value chain have been affected by too low prices and/or tariffs. Current module prices do not leave any room for R&D (innovation) and sadly, in some cases quality control.

These data are from August 2001. Currently Residential system prices average $4.00/Wp are only possible with module prices that are too low.  PV c-Si and TF technologies need to make a margin sufficient to continue innovating.  Recovery is crucial.

Labor is a variable and tends upward in cost (if you want qualified labor) and is typically not something a system integrator/developer can control.  Unfortunately, permitting is also a variable (region by region, US state by US state). 

Innovations in BoS, System design and installation and crucially, standardization of permitting and other soft costs are necessary. 

GRID-CONNECTED SYSTEM ECONOMICS*

 

Assumptions

Arithmetic

PV   system cost, per installed kWp

$4,500   (after 50% California state rebate)

Financed   as a first mortgage

7%   over 30 years – $359.98/year, or $29.99/month

Property   tax on actual value ($9,000)

1.1%   – $99/year, or $8.25/month

Federal   and state   tax brackets

31%,   9.3%

State   income tax, property tax deducted from federal income tax

$118/year,   or $9.83/month

Net   cost per installed kW

340.98/year,   or $28.41/month

Per   kWp installed (Northern California to   Southern California)   approximately 130 to 150 kWh per kWp installed

@   4.3 kWh/day/kWp Northern California –

$28.41/130     = 22¢/kWh; @ 5.0 kWh/day/kWp Southern California – $28.41/150 =   19¢/kWh